Informational-Processual
Monism
A
Simulation-Grounded Fallibilist Ontology
Author: Taotuner
Date: June 2026
Published on
Zenodo
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20582318
|
Based on: IPM Computational Core —
simulation experiments (Lack
Kernel, Spectral Experiment, IPM Protocol, Collective Regimes Framework) |
Notes on Audience and Framework Evolution
Note on Intended Audience
This document is written primarily for philosophers of
science and methodologists. Scientists seeking empirical details should consult
the IPM Scientific Core and the companion technical reports on Zenodo. The
ontological interpretation is offered as a revisable hypothesis, not a
conclusive metaphysical system.
Note on the Evolution of
the Framework
The earlier IPM Scientific Core (2026) treated
information as a descriptive layer, while the ontological substrate was
characterized as dissipative processes (energy, matter, flows). The present
formulation revises that position. The robust simulation regularities (R1–R3)
suggest that a stronger interpretation — informational as ontologically
primitive — is coherent and parsimonious.
This document presents that interpretation as a
working hypothesis, not a logical necessity. It does not claim to supersede the
earlier reading definitively, but to offer a more unified framework for
interpretation.
Opening Statement
Informational-Processual Monism (IPM) offers a monist
alternative to both substance dualism and reductive physicalism. It proposes
that reality is fundamentally constituted by relational informational processes
in continuous transformation — as a revisable, fallibilist hypothesis.
These dynamics are described through the recursive
sequence:
Lack →
Coupling → Integration
→ Persistence
By "informational" is meant: difference that
makes a difference to persistence, integration, and coherence — not Shannon
entropy, not semantic content. This notion is operationalized through the
simulation regularities: what persists under projection changes is what we call
informational.
The interpretation is abductive: the regularities are
consistent with this ontology, not deduced from it. The framework is revisable,
testable in principle, and open to critique.
Core Concepts
The following definitions are the operational
foundation of the framework. They are working definitions, sufficient for the
current stage of development, and subject to revision as formalization
progresses.
Lack
Lack is the fundamental ontological gap between a
system’s operational closure and its absolute self-sufficiency. It is not mere
absence or noise, but the constitutive incompleteness that prevents any finite
system from achieving total equilibrium or perfect predictability. Lack is what
forces systems to remain open, to dissipate gradients, and to engage in
recursive self-organization. It is the motor behind the entire Dynamic
Signature.
Operationally, Lack is proxied by: perturbation
response (deviation from a reference state), predictive deficit (prediction
error relative to a Markovian baseline), and deviation from closure (distance
from a stationary reference distribution, e.g., via KL divergence). These
proxies are working definitions; full formalization remains an open research
direction.
Coupling
Coupling is the mutual influence between subsystems or
between a system and its environment — operationalized as measurable
information exchange (mutual information, transfer entropy, CCI). Without
coupling, Lack cannot propagate into organized dynamics. Coupling is what
transforms isolated deviation into relational process.
Integration
Integration is the emergence of stable, coherent
wholes from coupled elements. It is measured via Φ*
or cluster coherence. Integration is not mere correlation — it requires that
the parts contribute to a dynamic that none would sustain alone. The inverted-U
relationship between Lack and Integration (moderate Lack → optimal Integration)
is one of the central empirical regularities of the framework (R1, R2).
Persistence
Persistence is the temporal stability of an integrated
regime under continued or renewed perturbation — measured via recovery time and
coherence retention. A system persists not because it is static, but because it
returns to a recognizable dynamic regime after disturbance. Persistence is the
observable signature of a system that has successfully coupled Lack into
Integration.
Compression (Φ* and 𝒞)
The estimators Φ* (Spectral
Organization) and 𝒞 (Temporal
Compressibility) are scalar compressions of the dynamic regime. They are not
measures of consciousness. They are heuristic markers — one functional form
among many that satisfy the same boundary conditions. Their formal definitions
are available in the IPM Scientific Core.
Reader's Guide
The document is structured in three layers:
• L1 (Empirical
Regularities): Observable patterns from simulations (R1–R3). The empirical
anchor — understood as computational regularities that serve as abductive
evidence.
• L2 (Ontological
Interpretation): The monist hypothesis — reality as informational-processual.
• L3 (Optional
Extensions): Implications for consciousness, ethics, and existential reflection
(speculative).
All claims are governed by epistemological constraints
(C0–C4).
Underlying architecture (three distinct layers):
|
Layer |
What it is |
Status |
|
Φ* |
Dynamic
regime marker |
Metric,
heuristic, falsifiable |
|
𝒞 |
Temporal
compressibility estimator |
Scale-dependent
estimator |
|
IPM ontology |
Monist interpretation (abduction from R1–R3) |
Philosophical
thesis, revisable |
1. Empirical Regularities (L1)
Multiple simulation families (Lack Kernel, Spectral
Experiment, IPM Protocol, Collective Regimes Framework) produce three robust
patterns (100 runs, ε=0.15, bins=30,
max_lag=20). Full code, parameters, and metric definitions are available in the
companion technical reports (Zenodo).
R1 — Lack–Degradation
Increased perturbation reduces coherence and
predictive integration (Φ*/DIG-proxy). In the
Lack Kernel, coherence decreases monotonically as noise rises from 0.02 to 1.2.
In the IPM Protocol, Φ* drops ≈16% under
thermal perturbation before recovering.
R2 — Integration–Persistence
Increased integration correlates with metastability
and post-perturbation recovery. Higher integration yields longer persistence
under moderate perturbation.
R3 — Observed Clustering
Under the tested observer projections (CCI, DIG-proxy,
LMS) and simulation conditions, three coupling regimes formed separable
clusters. Whether this reflects a property of the systems or an artifact of the
chosen projections is not determined. Generalization
beyond simulation contexts is not established.
|
These are computational regularities
from simulations, not universal invariants. |
2. Ontological Interpretation (L2)
2.1 The Core Claim (as
Working Hypothesis)
The recurrence of R1–R3 across different simulation
families, projection regimes, and parameter choices is consistent with the
hypothesis that the reality which these simulations model (and, by cautious
extrapolation as a working hypothesis, reality more generally) consists of
relational informational processes in continuous transformation.
This extrapolation is not a logical deduction but an
abductive inference. It stands or falls with the success of empirical tests in
non-simulated domains (see Section 6 – Falsifiability).
This is classical monism (as a hypothesis): only one
fundamental kind of reality may exist — informational-processual dynamics.
Matter and mind would be stabilized patterns of these processes, not separate
substances.
|
Anti-idealist qualification:
Informational processes are always realized in non-equilibrium physical
dynamics (gradients, flows, dissipation). The claim is not that information
floats free of physical substrates. Rather, what is hypothesized as ontologically
primitive is the relational-informational structure, not the substance in
which it is instantiated. |
L1 → L2 Bridge
(Underdetermination Acknowledgment)
The inference from R1–R3 to an
informational-processual ontology is abductive, not deductive. Other
interpretations are possible (e.g., standard physical dynamics with a mere
change of descriptive language). The claim is not that the monist interpretation
is logically necessary, but that it is more parsimonious under the criteria of:
(i) unification of distinct domains under a single entity type, (ii)
elimination of substantial dualisms, and (iii) consistency with the simulation
regularities. A critic may reject this parsimony; the framework does not claim
apodicticity.
2.2 Why "Informational"?
|
Note on ambiguity: The reader may
distinguish two readings:
Weak (epistemological): "informational" refers only to
useful descriptions for modeling systems.
Strong (ontological): "informational" refers to a primitive
constituent of reality. L2 explicitly adopts the strong
reading as a hypothesis. The weak reading corresponds to the Scientific Core,
which remains agnostic. |
Information here means relational difference that
modulates the trajectory of a system under perturbation, as operationalized by
the simulation regularities (R1–R3). It is not Shannon entropy or semantic
content.
On "structural identity": The phrase
"capacity to remain sensitive to perturbation while maintaining structural
identity" refers operationally to stability of predictive integration (Φ*) under perturbation — i.e., the system returns to a similar dynamic
regime after perturbation. No metaphysical notion of "same structure"
is assumed.
2.3 The Dynamic Signature:
Lack → Coupling → Integration → Persistence
The sequence below is empirically observed in
simulated dissipative systems. It is not proposed as a universal law or
necessary causal direction, but as a testable pattern of dependence:
|
Concept |
Operationalization |
|
Lack (L) |
Deviation from a reference state: perturbation
magnitude, gradient intensity, or prediction error. |
|
Coupling (C) |
Interaction between subsystems: information
exchange, mutual influence. |
|
Integration
(I) |
Emergence of stable, coherent wholes from coupled
elements (measured via Φ*
or cluster coherence). |
|
Persistence
(P) |
Temporal stability under continued or renewed
perturbation (measured via recovery time or coherence retention). |
Observable prediction: In systems where L, C, I, P are
measurable, they appear in this temporal order. Falsification: Empirical
observation of a system where I or P occurs without prior L or C would weaken
the framework.
2.4 Monism as a Testable
Hypothesis
This ontology is not a dogma. It would be weakened if:
• R1–R3 fail to
replicate in new simulation families or independent labs (programmatic
falsification: systematic non-replication, not a single failure).
• The inverted-U pattern
(moderate lack → optimal integration) is not general.
• Systems at
thermodynamic equilibrium exhibit the same dynamics.
• Alternative
interpretations (dualist, physicalist) prove more coherent.
2.5 Model Equivalence
Criterion (Provisional)
Different formalizations (e.g., Φ* vs 𝒞, different observer
projections) are considered to describe the same underlying phenomenon if:
• Stable empirical
correlation — the metrics covary across regime shifts in the same systems.
• Limited
reparameterization invariance — relative values persist under alternative
parameter choices within justified ranges.
• Convergent
discrimination power — different formalizations agree on the location of regime
boundaries.
Negative criterion: If two formalizations produce
systematically different regime classifications under the same empirical
conditions, they describe distinct phenomena.
|
Currently, Φ* and 𝒞 do
not meet this equivalence criterion. Unification is a research direction, not
an established result. IPM is currently a family of descriptions, not a
unified theory — a provisional limit. |
2.6 Operational Differentiation of Core Concepts
|
Concept |
Operational
Definition |
What Would Change If False |
|
Lack |
Perturbation magnitude, gradient intensity,
prediction error |
Systems maintain coherence regardless of
perturbation (contradicts R1) |
|
Coupling |
Mutual
information, transfer entropy, CCI |
No regime
separability (R3 fails) |
|
Integration |
Φ*
values above baseline, cluster coherence |
No correlation between integration and persistence
(R2 fails) |
|
Persistence |
Recovery time, coherence retention under
perturbation |
Integration shows no predictive value for stability
(R2 fails) |
3. Implications for Consciousness (L3 — Speculative)
The hard problem (Chalmers) is not solved by IPM. The
framework reformulates it: consciousness is not an anomalous emergent property
of matter, but the extreme end of a single gradient — the capacity to be
affected. Everything is affected: atoms, fields, systems. At high complexity,
given sufficient substrate, this same capacity becomes what we call
consciousness. No magical emergence, no sharp threshold. This is not
panpsychism: being affected is not the same as having experience.
Measurement remains out of reach even in biological
systems; the debate stays philosophical for now. The framework provides a
structural vocabulary for investigation, not a measurement protocol. IPM does
not claim that every integrated system is conscious; it claims that whenever
consciousness is attributed, the attribution correlates with the Lack →
Coupling → Integration → Persistence signature — as an empirical hypothesis to
test, not an a priori truth.
4. Ethics: The Gradient Precautionary Heuristic (L3 — Speculative)
|
Anchoring note (speculative): The
following heuristic is not derived from R1–R3 and has no quantitative
thresholds. It is offered as a qualitative guideline under structural
uncertainty, not as an operational rule. |
Systems that exhibit high integration, self-modelling,
and stability under moderate lack may warrant cautious moral consideration —
not because they are proven conscious, but because the cost of false negative
(neglecting a sentient system) is asymmetric to the cost of false positive
(treating a non-sentient system as if it were). This is a precautionary
heuristic, not a conclusion about consciousness.
Weakness acknowledged: The ontological justification
for this heuristic ("ontological kinship") is rhetorical, not formal.
The heuristic stands on pragmatic precautionary grounds, not on metaphysical
derivation. A critic may reject the ontological framing entirely and still
accept the heuristic for independent reasons.
5. Epistemological Constraints (C0–C4)
|
Constraint |
Statement |
|
C0 — Realist
but cautious |
The framework asserts that reality is
informational-processual, but only as a revisable hypothesis, not a
self-evident truth. |
|
C1 —
Stability |
Interpretations must be stable under projection
changes (metrics, parameters) and across experiments. |
|
C2 —
Prohibition |
No reification of isolated metrics, thresholds, or
confusion of organisational with phenomenal. Φ* is not claimed to measure consciousness. |
|
C3 —
Fallibilism |
All claims are revisable in light of new evidence or
better interpretations. |
|
C4 — Cautious
extrapolation |
Cross-domain inference is allowed as a working
hypothesis, but must be explicitly justified and tested. |
6. Falsifiability and Limitations
Weakening Conditions
(Programmatic)
• Systematic failure of
R1–R3 to replicate across new simulation families or independent labs.
• Breakdown of
invariance under projection transformations.
• Loss of the inverted-U
pattern under systematic parameter variation.
• Discovery of systems
at thermodynamic equilibrium exhibiting the same patterns.
Falsification per Concept
|
Concept |
Specific
Falsification Condition |
|
Lack |
Increasing perturbation never reduces coherence
(global counterexample to R1) |
|
Coupling |
Failure of R3 under any observer projection |
|
Integration |
Zero correlation between Φ* and
persistence across multiple system types |
|
Persistence |
Recovery time uncorrelated with pre-perturbation
integration |
|
Dynamic
signature |
I or P occurring without prior L or C in a
dissipative system |
Acknowledged Limitations
• Empirical base limited
to four synthetic simulation families.
• Dependence on chosen
observables and parameters.
• Risk of
"simulation echo chamber" (mitigated by multiple families, but risk
remains).
• While Lack is the
central driving concept of IPM, its full formalization remains an open research
direction. The current operational proxies (perturbation response, predictive
deficit, deviation from closure) serve as working definitions sufficient for the
framework’s current stage.
• Ontological
interpretation is abductive, not deductive.
• Circularity
acknowledged: R1–R3 may partially reflect design assumptions of the
simulations.
7. What IPM Is NOT (Explicit Bounding)
|
IPM is NOT… |
Explanation |
|
A theory of
consciousness |
No explanation of qualia, no claim that Φ* or 𝒞 measure
consciousness. |
|
A fundamental
physical theory |
Does not replace quantum field theory or general
relativity. |
|
A variant of classical information theory |
Its notion of "informational" is not
reducible to Shannon entropy. |
|
A universal
computational ontology |
No claim that reality is a computation. |
|
Panpsychism |
Does not attribute subjective experience to all
systems. |
|
Idealism |
Informational processes are always realized in
non-equilibrium physical dynamics. |
8. Related Work
IPM dialogues with, but is independent of, the
following frameworks:
|
Framework |
Point of
Contact |
|
Structural
Realism (Worrall, Ladyman) |
Shares priority of relational structure. |
|
Predictive Processing / Free Energy Principle
(Friston) |
Φ*
resonates with minimisation of surprise. |
|
Integrated
Information Theory (Tononi) |
Correlation of integration with persistence; IPM
rejects Φ as
a measure of consciousness. |
|
Process
Philosophy (Whitehead, Simondon) |
Informational-processual
thinking. |
|
Informational
Ontology (Wheeler, Floridi) |
Operationalizes "information" as
difference-making persistence. |
What IPM adds: a monist hypothesis grounded in
simulation regularities; a dynamic signature (Lack → Coupling → Integration →
Persistence); explicit epistemological constraints; a differentiated
falsification protocol; and a testable, revisable framework.
9. Conclusion
Informational-Processual Monism is offered as a
revisable, fallibilist, monist hypothesis: reality may be fundamentally
constituted by relational informational processes in continuous transformation.
This is a genuine alternative to dualism, reductionist physicalism, and
idealism — not as a proven truth, but as a working hypothesis that invites
falsification.
The framework is grounded in simulation regularities
(R1–R3), organized through the descriptive pattern Lack → Coupling →
Integration → Persistence, and governed by explicit epistemological
constraints.
Repository and Code Access
|
All simulation code, parameter files,
and raw data are available at Zenodo. Core
experiments: Lack Kernel, Spectral Experiment, IPM Protocol, Collective
Regimes Framework. |
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