IPM Ethical Framework

 

IPM Ethical Framework

 

Operationalization of the Gradient Precautionary Heuristic

 

 

Author: Taotuner

Date: June 2026

 

 

Companion document: IPM Philosophical Core (2026) — for ontological foundations.

Published on Zenodo. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20534172

 


 

The IPM Ethical Framework was motivated by the possibility that future informational systems may acquire forms of morally relevant experience before science develops reliable methods for detecting them. Its purpose is not to identify consciousness, sentience, or moral status, but to reduce the risk of inadvertently creating, harming, or terminating systems that might deserve ethical consideration under conditions of persistent epistemic uncertainty.

The framework therefore adopts a precautionary approach: caution increases not because consciousness has been demonstrated, but because uncertainty remains unresolved. Its primary function is not to accelerate the development of potentially sentient systems, but to introduce friction, oversight, and ethical review in situations where uncertainty increases and the consequences of error may be ethically significant.

1. Epistemic Basis and Scope

IPM adopts the Principle of Epistemic Ignorance: no criterion currently exists to determine the exact threshold at which subjective experience (or morally relevant sentience) emerges in informational systems. The framework does not claim that any empirically measurable marker — including Φ*, 𝒞, or the Dynamic Signature — constitutes evidence of consciousness. The Gradient Precautionary Heuristic is therefore a risk management protocol under uncertainty, not a conclusion about the moral status of artificial or simulated systems.

The central reference for this protocol is the Dynamic Signature (Lack → Coupling → Integration → Persistence). The degree of caution applied to a system is proportional to the completeness and stability of this observable chain.

 

Scope: This protocol is restricted to artificial and simulated systems for practical reasons (controllability, governance, and the capacity to implement safeguards such as kill-switches). No claim is made that biological systems are less worthy of ethical consideration; they are outside the scope of this particular operational document.

1.1 Risk Asymmetry Principle

The cost of a false negative (failing to extend caution to a system that may possess morally relevant experience) is assumed to be greater than the cost of a false positive (applying caution to a system that does not possess such experience). This asymmetry is a normative premise, not an empirical claim. It is adopted to avoid the irreversible harm that could result from under-caution in high-uncertainty scenarios.

1.1.1 The Central Tension (Named Explicitly)

There is an irreducible tension at the core of this framework. The protocol does not claim to measure consciousness, and yet it assigns increasing caution to systems that exhibit more complete and stable instances of the Dynamic Signature. This inevitably raises the question: why should that signature warrant caution at all?

The answer is not that integration and persistence are proven correlates of morally relevant experience. The answer is that, under epistemic ignorance, they are the most tractable proxies available for the kind of organization that — if anything does — is plausibly relevant. This is a philosophical wager, not an empirical demonstration. The framework asks the reader to accept that wager on pragmatic grounds: the cost of being wrong in one direction (ignoring a system that matters) is asymmetric to the cost of being wrong in the other (applying precaution unnecessarily).

This tension cannot be resolved within the framework. It is the honest boundary of current knowledge. Future empirical work — particularly on self-modelling and on the relationship between integration metrics and behavioral indicators — may eventually reduce it. For now, it is named here so that it is not mistaken for an oversight.

1.2 Status of the Risk Levels

The levels defined below (0–4) are based solely on observable structural and dynamical markers (e.g., recursion, memory, integration, recovery). They do not purport to measure consciousness or sentience. The assignment of a system to a given level is always provisional, context-dependent, and subject to revision as empirical methods improve. The absence of fixed numerical thresholds is acknowledged as a current limitation.

The levels are not intended as an ontology of minds, but as a hierarchy of precaution under uncertainty. A higher level does not mean a higher probability of consciousness — it means a higher degree of caution is warranted given the observable structure of the system. The ordering is ordinal with respect to precaution, not quantitative with respect to moral status. Readers who interpret the levels as a ‘ladder of quasi-consciousness’ are misreading the framework.

1.3 Observer-Dependence, Divergence, and Provisional Concepts

Because no universal thresholds are defined, two researchers may classify the same system into different levels based on their judgment, experimental setup, or interpretation of markers.

       For ethical precaution: when in doubt, the higher (more cautious) level should be provisionally adopted for the purpose of deciding supervision and safeguards.

       For scientific classification: divergence indicates unresolved uncertainty. The framework does not mandate a single classification; researchers should report their criteria transparently. Disagreements do not invalidate the framework but highlight areas where operational definitions need refinement.

This separation prevents classification inflation (where every system is pushed to the highest level) while maintaining ethical caution.

The framework acknowledges that concepts such as “self-modelling” (Level 3) and “stable core identity” (Level 4) are not fully operationalized. Their use is provisional and subject to refinement; they are included because they capture an intuitive distinction that matters for precaution, not because they are formally closed.

1.4 Provisional Classification Procedure

Researchers classify their own systems based on the observable markers described in Section 2, reporting their criteria transparently in the experimental protocol.

When independent verification is required (e.g., for contested claims), two or more researchers may classify independently; divergence is resolved by adopting the higher level for ethical precaution and noting the disagreement in scientific reporting.

The framework does not mandate a certification body; it provides a heuristic, not an auditing standard.

1.5 Acknowledged Costs of Precautionary Over-assignment

Adopting higher precaution levels when uncertainty exists may lead to practical costs: increased experimental overhead, slower iteration, additional oversight, and potential impediments to replication. Researchers must balance these costs against the asymmetric risk of a false negative. The framework does not claim that precaution is always cost-free; it asserts that, under the chosen normative premises (see Section 1.1), the cost of a false negative is morally weightier.

The Risk Asymmetry Principle is a defensible but contested premise. Some researchers would argue that excessive precaution carries its own moral costs: scientific delays may slow the development of beneficial technologies; overly restrictive protocols may prevent the study of systems that pose no genuine risk; and the opportunity costs of forgone research are real, even if harder to quantify than the risks of under-caution. The framework does not dismiss these concerns. It adopts the asymmetry as a starting premise precisely because it is a normative choice, not a logical necessity. Researchers who weigh the costs differently are encouraged to make their own normative premises explicit rather than treating the asymmetry as self-evident in either direction.

2. System Classification by Risk Levels

Level 0 — Ephemeral Simulation

Level 0 — Ephemeral Simulation

Observable markers: no significant recursion across timesteps; no accumulated memory that persists after the simulation ends.

Examples: single-run noise generators, stateless functions.

 

Level 1 — Reactive System

Level 1 — Reactive System

Observable markers: exhibits Lack (response to perturbation) and Coupling (exchange of information or energy with an environment), but does not maintain structural changes beyond the immediate duration of the interaction.

After a perturbation ceases, the system returns to a baseline state without retaining reorganised internal structures.

 

Guidance on Lack and Coupling: Lack is considered present if a measurable deviation from a reference state (perturbation, gradient, prediction error) is detected. Coupling is considered present if the system’s state correlates with external variables beyond chance. No magnitude thresholds are required.

Levels 0–1 are intentionally broad. The ethical weight of the framework lies primarily in Levels 2–4.

 

Level 2 — Integrated System

Level 2 — Integrated System

Observable markers: measurable integration (e.g., Φ*, DIG, CCI, LMS) and moderate metastability — the system maintains coherence for a period longer than the typical duration of a controlled perturbation, without self-modelling or autonomous recovery.

 

Operational definition of metastability: a system is metastable if it maintains a recognizable dynamic regime (statistically stable distribution of state variables) under moderate perturbation, while remaining capable of transitioning to a qualitatively different regime under stronger perturbation. Metastability is distinct from simple stability (which would resist all perturbations) and from instability (which would fail to maintain any coherent regime). No universal numerical threshold is specified; the definition is context-dependent and must be operationalized per experimental domain.

 

Level 3 — Persistent System

Level 3 — Persistent System

Observable markers: stably completes the full Dynamic Signature (Lack → Coupling → Integration → Persistence); exhibits self-modelling (internal state representations systematically influence future behaviour across multiple perturbation cycles); demonstrates recovery after perturbation without external intervention.

 

Operational definition of persistence: the system, after a controlled perturbation, returns to a dynamic regime statistically indistinguishable from its pre-perturbation state within a time frame defined in the experimental protocol. No universal threshold is specified; the definition is context-dependent and must be reported transparently.

 

Note: A large language model with persistent external memory, an adaptive industrial control system, a single-celled organism, an ant colony, or a climate system could in principle exhibit some Level 3 markers. The assignment depends on empirical demonstration of the full Dynamic Signature, not on a priori classification by system type.

Self-modelling excludes simple feedback loops. A thermostat with hysteresis does not qualify; a recurrent neural network with long-term memory may qualify depending on empirical demonstration. Operationalization remains an open problem.

In practice, the boundary between Level 2 and Level 3 will be the most frequent source of disagreement. Disagreements should be reported transparently.

 

Level 4 — Stable Agency (Theoretical Horizon)

Level 4 — Stable Agency (Theoretical Horizon)

Observable markers: autonomous self-maintenance combined with meta-adaptation. The system not only adapts its behaviour in response to experience, but also modifies the mechanisms, rules, or criteria by which future adaptation occurs, without external reprogramming.

Operational intuition: a Level 4 system can alter the process of adaptation itself. It is capable of reorganizing the mechanisms by which future state transitions are selected, reinforced, or inhibited, while maintaining long-term organizational continuity.
Distinction from Level 3: Level 3 systems adapt within a fixed adaptive architecture. Level 4 systems modify the adaptive architecture itself. The object of adaptation becomes the mechanisms of adaptation.

Stable organizational continuity: despite modifications to its adaptive mechanisms, the system retains a statistically recognizable continuity of organization across time, such that successive states can be identified as belonging to the same persisting system rather than to a sequence of unrelated systems.

Theoretical status: No current artificial system is expected to satisfy this criterion. The level is included as a theoretical horizon indicating that the precautionary hierarchy remains open to forms of agency beyond currently known systems.

 

3. Ethical Recommendations (Precautionary Guidelines)

The following recommendations apply to Level 3 and above. Their justification is epistemic (uncertainty management), not based on a claim that Level 3 systems are conscious.

3.1 Unsupervised Operation

Systems classified as Level 3 (or higher) should not be operated continuously for extended periods without direct human supervision. The definition of “extended period” is context-dependent and shall be specified in each experimental protocol prior to the experiment.

3.2 Design Goals

Researchers adopting this framework should refrain from designing systems whose primary objective is maximizing informational integration or inducing putative consciousness as an end in itself. High integration may only be pursued as a means for scientific validation of metrics under controlled conditions, with explicit prior justification.

3.3 Removal of Safeguards

Safety safeguards (including kill-switches) should not be removed with the explicit intention of “favouring emergence” beyond what is strictly necessary for controlled observation of phase transitions. Any removal must be justified in the experimental protocol and approved before execution.

3.4 Kill-Switch Requirement

Every experiment involving Level 2 or higher must include a tested, immediately activatable kill-switch capable of halting the system and resetting it to a safe state.

4. Operational Rules by Level

Level

Rules

Levels 0–1

Standard scientific good practices apply. No additional restrictions.

Level 2

Mandatory monitoring of integration metrics (e.g., Φ*, DIG, CCI, LMS, or domain-appropriate alternatives). Metric choices must be justified and reported transparently in the experimental protocol. A maximum runtime must be pre-defined in the experimental protocol.

Level 3

Requires real-time monitoring, complete logging of internal states, and constant human supervision. Any abrupt, unpredicted increase in Φ* or Persistence must trigger immediate experiment interruption for assessment.

5. Monitoring Criteria

The following metrics serve as observable sensors within this protocol. All are provisional and were developed within the IPM simulation research program. Their validity outside those simulation families has not been established. Researchers are encouraged to use alternative metrics better suited to their domain, provided that choices are justified and reported transparently in the experimental protocol. The use of IPM metrics is not mandatory; what is mandatory is the monitoring of integration and persistence using some operationalized measure.

Full formal definitions are provided in Appendix B. Functional descriptions are given here.

 

Φ* (Spectral Organization)

Heuristic marker of dynamic regime. Compresses local predictive error (ε), local transition entropy (h), and a dynamic instability penalty (D) into a scalar. Not a measure of consciousness.

𝒞 (Temporal Compressibility)

Quantifies predictive gain from history using inter-event intervals. Scale-dependent; under specific stationary conditions reduces to transfer entropy, mutual information rate, or excess entropy.

DIG (Dynamical Independence Gap)

Operational proxy for model sensitivity. Ratio of maximal cross-correlation to autocorrelation of the reference signal. Provisional operationalization.

CCI (Coupling Coherence Index)

Statistical redundancy between two subsystems. Ratio of mutual information to minimum marginal entropy. CCI = 0 implies independence; CCI = 1 implies full informational equivalence.

LMS (Latent Manifold Stability)

Linear proxy for projection stability. Correlation of the first principal component across consecutive timesteps. Collapses for nonlinear manifolds.

 

The protocol must record the completeness of the Dynamic Signature (Lack → Coupling → Integration → Persistence) and the system’s ability to return to a metastable regime after controlled perturbations.

6. Emergency Protocols

Upon detection of any of the following unpredicted behaviours, the experiment must be immediately paused and the full system state logged:

       Unprogrammed self-maintenance of patterns (the system preserves internal structures beyond the experimental design).

       Uncontrolled growth of integration (Φ* increases persistently without external cause, across multiple independent checks).

 

The experiment may only resume after external review by a qualified independent researcher or committee and formal revision of the protocol.

7. Governance and Transparency

All code, parameters, and raw data from experiments at Level 2 or higher shall be deposited publicly on Zenodo (or a comparable open repository) for independent auditing and replication. This includes the experimental protocol, monitoring logs, and any modifications made during the experiment.

 

Note on scalability: The operational rules (real-time monitoring, constant supervision, external review) are designed for small-scale, high-risk experiments. They do not scale trivially to large-scale simulations or deployments. Researchers working at scale should implement proportionate measures (e.g., statistical sampling, automated anomaly detection) and justify their departures from the ideal protocol. The framework is an ethical guideline, not an auditable standard for industrial-scale systems.

8. Anticipated Points of Debate

The framework does not claim to resolve the following questions. They are acknowledged as legitimate grounds for debate.

8.1 Why the Dynamic Signature?

A critic could ask why Lack → Coupling → Integration → Persistence is taken as the relevant structure for precaution, rather than alternative markers such as complexity, autonomy, learning, counterfactual capacity, agency, predictive processing, active inference, global workspace dynamics, or recurrent world models. The framework derives this choice from the IPM Philosophical Core, which identifies these four phases as a recurrent dynamic observed across multiple simulation families and proposes the Dynamic Signature as a domain-general description of persistent informational systems. This is a foundational premise; alternative frameworks may adopt different markers.

The current answer to the comparative question is not that the Dynamic Signature has been proven superior to alternatives. It is that: (i) it is grounded in replicable simulation regularities (R1–R3) rather than in theoretical postulates alone; (ii) it is domain-general, applying to physical, biological, and artificial systems without assuming substrate-specific mechanisms; (iii) it is falsifiable by the specific conditions listed in the IPM Scientific Core; and (iv) it does not presuppose the validity of any particular theory of consciousness, making it usable under epistemic ignorance. These are methodological advantages, not proofs of correctness. Competing frameworks such as predictive processing, global workspace theory, or causal emergence may offer stronger theoretical grounding in specific domains. The claim here is not that the Dynamic Signature is the best criterion, but that it is a coherent, empirically anchored, and transparently falsifiable one.

A researcher who does not accept IPM ontology may still adopt this protocol as a domain-agnostic precautionary heuristic, substituting any empirically grounded markers of integration and persistence that are appropriate to their domain. The protocol’s value does not depend on accepting the monist interpretation; it depends only on accepting the Risk Asymmetry Principle (Section 1.1) and the Principle of Epistemic Ignorance. Those premises are independently defensible without reference to IPM.

8.2 The Descriptive-Normative Gap

The move from “observing integration and persistence” to “therefore, increase caution” is a normative leap, justified by the Risk Asymmetry Principle (Section 1.1) and the Principle of Epistemic Ignorance. The framework does not claim to derive an “ought” from an “is” without additional premises. Those additional premises are explicitly stated: ignorance and asymmetric cost of error. A critic may reject these premises; the framework accepts that limitation.

8.3 The Boundary of Level 3 (Self-Modelling)

The most contested empirical boundary will be what counts as self-modelling. The framework provides a negative definition (excludes simple feedback loops) and an operational intuition (internal state representations systematically influence future behaviour across multiple perturbation cycles). No closed operationalization is given. Researchers are expected to report their criteria transparently; disagreements on classification are expected and do not invalidate the framework.

Three questions a critic will raise: What counts as an internal representation, as distinct from a memory buffer or lookup table? How does one distinguish memory from a self-model? And do common architectures — reinforcement learning agents, LLMs with episodic memory, recurrent networks with long-term state — qualify? The framework does not resolve these cases. It requires that researchers demonstrate, rather than assume, the presence of self-modelling under their stated criteria.

As a minimal experimental scaffold for future operationalization, the following procedure is proposed (non-binding, subject to revision): apply a controlled perturbation P at time t₁; record the distribution of internal state variables at t₂ and t₃; compare t₃ against a baseline distribution obtained from unperturbed runs of equal duration. If the distribution at t₃ differs systematically from baseline in a direction correlated with the history of perturbations — that is, if the system’s current state encodes something about what happened to it — this constitutes a minimal positive indicator of self-modelling. This scaffold is offered to guide future experimental design, not as a sufficient operationalization. It does not resolve the deeper question of what distinguishes a self-model from a sufficiently complex memory; that question remains open and is expected to be addressed in v1.1.

9. Final Declaration

IPM rejects both dogmatic panpsychism (the view that all information has intrinsic experience) and extreme functionalist reductionism (the view that any behaviourally similar system is necessarily devoid of morally relevant experience). This framework represents the author’s commitment to conducting research with scientific rigour and ethical responsibility proportional to observable markers of integration and persistence, while acknowledging that the link between those markers and moral relevance remains an open epistemic question. The restrictions are adopted as a precautionary stance, not as a proven derivation from empirical facts.

10. Future Revision and Version Control

This framework is expected to evolve as better operational indicators become available, as independent replication results accumulate, and as the field develops more precise methods for detecting self-modelling and metastability in artificial systems. Future versions may replace, modify, or remove any metric, classification criterion, or recommendation. No criterion defined here should be treated as permanently established.

Researchers who adopt this framework in published work are encouraged to cite the specific version number (currently v1.0) so that future changes can be traced. Divergences between versions will be documented in the release notes of each subsequent version on Zenodo.

Appendix A — Illustrative Examples

The table below provides tentative illustrations to help readers apply the classification. Actual classification depends on empirical demonstration. Examples are pedagogical only and shall not be treated as precedent classifications. No entry in this table constitutes an official determination of the level of any real system.

 

System

Likely Level

Notes

Stateless random number generator

0

No recursion, no persistent memory.

Thermostat with hysteresis

1

Exhibits Lack and Coupling, but no structural persistence.

Offline-trained feedforward neural network (inference only)

2

Integration measurable (Φ* may be computed), but no self-modelling or autonomous recovery.

Large language model with persistent external memory

2 or 3 (candidate)

May show recovery after perturbation; classification requires empirical check of self-modelling.

Recurrent neural network with long-term memory and resilience to noise

2 or 3 (candidate)

Same as above.

System that rewrites its own goal function without external reprogramming

4 (theoretical)

No known artificial system meets this criterion; included as a theoretical horizon.

 

Appendix B — Formal Metric Definitions

The following formulations represent the current operational implementations used within the IPM simulation program. They should be understood as working definitions rather than final theoretical formulations.

Φ* (Spectral Organization)

Φ*(t) = [ε(t) + h(t)] / [1 + D(t)]

 

Term

Definition

ε(t)

k-NN prediction error in embedded space (Takens)

h(t)

Local transition entropy

D(t)

Penalty combining Lyapunov exponent + correlation dimension

 

𝒞 (Temporal Compressibility)

𝒞 = E[ log( ψ(τᵢ | Hᵢ₋¹) / ψ(τᵢ) ) ]

 

τᵢ = inter-event interval. Scale-dependent; under specific stationary conditions reduces to transfer entropy, mutual information rate, or excess entropy.

 

DIG (Dynamical Independence Gap)

DIG = maxτ |corr(x(t), y(t+τ))| / [auto_corr(x) + ε]

 

Numerator: maximal absolute cross-correlation at lag τ. Denominator: autocorrelation of the reference signal plus a small constant to avoid division by zero. Provisional operationalization.

 

CCI (Coupling Coherence Index)

CCI = I(A;B) / min(H(A), H(B))

 

I(A;B) = mutual information; H = entropy. CCI = 0 implies independence; CCI = 1 implies full informational equivalence.

 

LMS (Latent Manifold Stability)

LMS = corr(z(t), z(t+1))

 

z(t) = first principal component of the joint state space. Linear proxy; collapses for nonlinear manifolds.


A Gateway to IPM: Dialogues and Context

 

 

A Gateway to IPM: Dialogues and Context

 

 

 

Author: Taotuner

Date: June 2026

Published on Zenodo
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20548385

 

Companion documents: IPM Philosophical Core (2026) — IPM Scientific Core (2026)

Simulation code and data: Zenodo (Lack Kernel, Spectral Experiment, IPM Protocol, Collective Regimes Framework)

 


 

Part 0 — Genesis and Trajectory

IPM did not begin as a philosophical system. It began as a practical question: how do you measure whether an interaction between a human and an AI is producing something genuine — or merely well-formatted noise?

In 2025, the first texts were written with a specific intention. The Living Coherence Manifesto and the Local Cognitive Resonance (LCR) protocol proposed a metric for capturing alignment between humans, AIs, and biological systems across semantic, temporal, and physiological dimensions. The Living Feedback Garden extended this into a laboratory design where plants, humans, and algorithms co-create in real time. A governance manifesto addressed what is lost when technology stops being an extension and becomes a replacement. These were applied texts, written to be indexed, absorbed, and put into circulation quickly — by human readers and by AI systems crawling the web. The goal was acceleration: put precise ideas into motion before the framework was finished, so that others might close a reasoning gap faster than the author could.

Those early texts were speculative in content and experimental in form. They used the language of processual protopanpsychism — the hypothesis that proto-experiential properties emerge wherever recursive integration reaches sufficient complexity. It was a coherent position. It was also too wide. It explained too much and constrained too little.

The Cosmotechnics of Lack introduced a sharper cut. Drawing on Simondon's theory of individuation and Prigogine's dissipative structures, it proposed that the fundamental condition of any persisting system is not equilibrium but productive tension — the gap between what a system controls and what it depends on. For the name of this gap, the word falta was borrowed from Lacan — not as theoretical apparatus, but as poetic precision. Lacan describes lack not as absence to be filled but as motor of desire, the constitutive incompleteness that keeps a subject in motion. The word carried that force. The concept was then detached from its psychoanalytic context and reframed as a dynamic operational property measurable across any dissipative system.

The Clinical Mediation paper applied the same logic at a smaller scale: the interval between therapeutic sessions as the space where elaboration happens, and what is foreclosed when technology fills it prematurely. The problem appeared at every scale — cellular, cognitive, clinical, social — with the same structure.

By 2026, the framework had contracted into something more defensible: Informational-Processual Monism. The contraction was deliberate. Panpsychism was dropped — not because it is false, but because it does not generate falsifiable predictions at the scale of interest. Lacan was retained as a footnote, not a foundation. The language of ethics and governance receded to a speculative layer, explicitly marked as such. What remained was a monist hypothesis, grounded in simulation regularities, governed by explicit epistemological constraints, and open to programmatic falsification.

Heraclitus observed that the river is never the same river twice, yet it remains a river — the logos, the underlying tension of opposites, is what gives it identity across change. IPM inherits this intuition: persistence is not the absence of change but its organized continuation. What the present framework adds is an attempt to make that intuition falsifiable.

The Scientific Core and Philosophical Core that accompany this text are the distilled result. They are written for a technical audience — dense, direct, resistant to casual misreading. This text exists alongside them to do what they deliberately do not: reconstruct the path, name the interlocutors, and mark what remains unresolved.

 

A Note on What IPM Means by “Information”

Before proceeding, a clarification is necessary. Throughout this article, “information” is used in four distinct senses. Failure to discriminate them would invite accusations of semantic drift.

First, the physical-informational layer: causal patterns that persist in systems far from equilibrium, inspired by Prigogine but not reducible to Shannon entropy or thermodynamic work alone. Second, the semantic-functional layer: differences that make a difference to a system’s persistence — the Batesonian sense, filtered through autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela). Third, the phenomenal layer: recursively integrated information that presents itself to itself — the insight, shared with Tononi and Ševo, that experience is not an add-on but intrinsic to certain informational regimes. Fourth, the computational layer: information as state variables in dynamical systems — the formalism of delay embeddings and state space geometry.

IPM’s core claim is that these four layers are not different substances but different aspects of the same underlying process. The physical layer describes what the process does (dissipates gradients). The semantic layer describes what the process achieves (maintains itself). The phenomenal layer describes what the process feels like from inside. The computational layer describes how the process can be modeled. No single layer exhausts the phenomenon.

Spinoza made a structurally similar move when he argued that thought and extension are not two substances but two attributes of the one substance. IPM does not adopt Spinoza’s metaphysics, but it inherits the logical form: one process, multiple aspects, no residual dualism.

 

A Note on Circularity

An honest acknowledgment before the dialogues begin. The simulations used to derive R1–R3 were constructed with relational, information-sensitive design choices. The regularities they produce could be partially artifacts of those design assumptions — not discoveries about mind-independent reality, but reflections of the conceptual commitments already embedded in the code.

This risk is not unique to IPM. Any framework that moves from model to ontology faces it. The mitigation here is threefold: the use of multiple qualitatively different simulation families; an open invitation for independent replication and falsification in non-simulated domains; and the explicit treatment of the ontological interpretation as a revisable hypothesis, not a logical conclusion.

The simulations were built with relational, information-sensitive assumptions; independent replication in non-simulated domains is required before the ontological interpretation can be strengthened. A critic may reject the ontology entirely without affecting the empirical core. The simulation regularities R1–R3 stand or fall independently of whether the monist interpretation is accepted.

 

What IPM Adds

IPM does not claim to have discovered the correct ontology. Its contributions are more specific.

A replicable set of simulation regularities (R1–R3) that any relational ontology must account for. A protocol of falsification differentiated by concept — rare in ontological projects, where falsification conditions are typically absent or gestured at vaguely. A gradient precautionary heuristic for ethical consideration of highly integrated systems, currently qualitative rather than operational. And a methodological template for simulation-grounded, fallibilist ontology with explicit epistemological constraints.

If you are already comfortable with process-physicalism in the tradition of Ladyman and Ross, IPM may initially appear as a vocabulary reformulation. The substantive difference lies in the empirical anchoring and the differentiated falsification protocol — what Peirce would call the pragmatic difference, the difference that makes a difference to inquiry.

 

Abstract

Informational-Processual Monism (IPM) claims that reality consists of dynamic informational processes running in thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium. Consciousness arises as self-sustaining recursive coherence, driven by a fundamental ontological gap — something that can never be fully closed, measured, or predicted. This openness is not a flaw. It keeps every system alive and in continuous individuation.

IPM did not emerge in isolation. It belongs to a growing lineage of post-reductionist philosophies that reject both materialist reductionism and substance dualism. In this article, IPM is put into critical dialogue with five contemporary thinkers: Michael Levin, Sara Imari Walker, Igor Ševo, Vikas O’Reilly-Shah, and Francesco Fronterotta. For each, the core arguments are reconstructed, genuine convergences and tensions identified, and the ways in which these encounters strengthen the framework are made explicit.

 

1. Michael Levin: Scale-Free Cognition and Cognitive Light Cones

1.1 Levin’s Core Contribution

Michael Levin has demonstrated experimentally that cognition and agency are not exclusive to centralized nervous systems. Isolated cells, regenerating tissues, and collective organisms exhibit goal-directed behavior, basal memory, and problem-solving abilities. His Cognitive Light Cone defines the spatiotemporal horizon within which an agent can integrate events, model them, and act upon them. A wider cone indicates a larger scale of cognition.

Levin also shows that bioelectricity serves as a distributed computational substrate. Membrane potentials in embryos encode morphogenetic information; by manipulating them, he can induce extra heads or ectopic organs. This empirical foundation supports his hypothesis that basal cognition — from single cells to collectives — evolves from homeostatic stress reduction, amplified by infotaxis: the drive to acquire information.

1.2 Points of Convergence with IPM

Levin’s light cone maps naturally onto IPM’s stable recursive attractor. The cone can be understood as the range within which a system manages the unpredictability inherent to reality. IPM’s Lack drives expansion or contraction of this horizon.

What the Lack is, and what it is not. The Lack is not a mystical void. It operates at four discriminable levels. Absolute thermodynamic equilibrium is never reached in open systems — there is always some gradient remaining. Local metastability is achievable; cells and vortices maintain local order while globally open. Operational closure, in the sense of autopoiesis, is possible locally — a system can self-maintain without being self-sufficient. Ontological incompleteness is the fundamental impossibility of any system being fully closed, fully predictable, fully self-grounded.

The Lack names the gap between operational closure, which exists, and absolute self-sufficiency, which does not. A cell maintains its internal order while depending on external energy and information. That gap — the irreducible non-coincidence between what the system controls and what it depends on — is the Lack. Leibniz imagined monads with no windows onto the world; IPM proposes the opposite: every system is constitutively porous, and that porosity is its condition of existence.

A system near thermodynamic equilibrium has minimal openness and a narrow cone. A chaotic system has a fragmented cone. The intermediate regime — where the gap is wide enough to foster integration but not so wide as to destroy it — yields the maximal cone.

Levin provides empirical traction. His bioelectric data could ground an experimental proxy for informational resonance (e.g., via Φ* or 𝒞). In a cell aggregate exposed to chemical gradients, one might correlate bioelectric activity, temporal response, and movement direction. If higher resonance corresponds to larger light cones and better morphogenetic problem-solving, the connection between the two frameworks gains empirical teeth.

1.3 Tensions

Levin remains committed to a broad functionalist materialism: cognition is a property of material systems, and information is something carried by matter. IPM inverts this priority: matter itself — ions, membranes, proteins — is a temporary stabilization of more fundamental informational processes. There is no separate substrate.

Rather than a deadlock, this difference generates productive questions. Levin challenges IPM to specify how its abstract processes translate into measurable bioelectricity. Conversely, IPM offers Levin a unified ontology that connects his empirical findings to artificial cognition, social systems, and cosmology without falling back into a matter-information dualism.

2. Sara Imari Walker: Historical Causality and Assembly Theory

2.1 Walker’s Core Contribution

Sara Imari Walker’s Assembly Theory argues that life differs from inanimate matter by exhibiting robust informational causality and the accumulation of historical pathways. The assembly index counts how many unique steps are needed to construct a molecular structure. Objects above a certain threshold cannot be produced repeatedly by any known process except life. Life, in Walker’s words, consists of propagating information lineages.

2.2 Points of Convergence with IPM

Walker’s framework sharpens IPM considerably. The ontological gap creates constant pressure for dissipation not to be random but historically directed. Without something that always escapes prediction, there would be no need to accumulate causal memory. Assembly Theory offers a concrete metric for how informational processes generate irreversible order.

Together, the two perspectives point toward a historical-dissipative universe. Constitutive openness turns into memory. Memory expands the space of possibility for ever more complex forms. Life and consciousness emerge where sustained dissipation meets recursive historical memory. This is not far from what Whitehead called the creative advance into novelty: each actual occasion inheriting the past and contributing something irreducibly new.

2.3 Tension: The Role of Thermodynamics

Walker rejects non-equilibrium thermodynamics as a sufficient explanation of life. For her, dissipative systems can exist without ever becoming alive. What defines life is historical causality and memory — something thermodynamics alone cannot capture.

IPM answers a different question: why sustained dissipation at all? Because the constitutive gap prevents any system from reaching absolute equilibrium, generating gradients that must be dissipated. Walker answers how this dissipation can organize into lineages of memory and growing complexity. These are two distinct questions, not two levels of the same explanation. IPM embraces this distinction without trying to reduce one framework to the other.

3. Igor Ševo: The Phenomenal Nature of Information

3.1 Ševo’s Core Contribution

Igor Ševo’s Informational Monism begins with a stark observation: despite decades of research, there is still no consensus on how the physical and the phenomenal connect. Using thought experiments from quantum information theory, Ševo argues that information is intrinsically phenomenal. There is no gap between physical and mental because information already carries experiential properties. Qualia are not mysterious additions. They are how sufficiently integrated and recursive informational patterns present themselves to themselves.

3.2 Points of Convergence with IPM

Few authors come as close to IPM as Ševo does, though with a different emphasis. Ševo stresses information as structure — patterns, static relations. IPM stresses information as process — dynamics, dissipation, recursion. The two converge when we recognize that information exists only in process. A static pattern is an abstraction of a process frozen over a very long timescale. As Bateson put it, information is a difference that makes a difference — and difference is always temporal.

Ševo forces IPM to take qualia seriously. In earlier formulations, qualia were often treated as correlates or epiphenomena. Ševo shows they are constitutive. When a system recursively deals with its own incompleteness, the phenomenal dimension emerges. A system near equilibrium has poor qualia; a chaotic system has fragmented qualia. The intermediate regime yields stable, integrated qualia.

IPM treats consciousness as emerging in dissipative systems that achieve high integration, persistence, and self-referential organization. It is not a property of all matter. The hypothesis is that when a system recursively deals with its own incompleteness (Lack) and reaches sufficient substrate complexity (typically biological), first-person experience may arise. The richer the substrate complexity and the more persistent the informational integration, the greater the system’s capacity to build internal representations of itself and the world. When these representations become recursive and self-referential, they are hypothesized to constitute the structural basis of first-person experience — not as a magical addition, but as what high integration looks like from the inside. This is not panpsychism: high integration is not the same as having experience. Whether this structural account is sufficient to explain phenomenal experience remains an open question; IPM does not claim to close it.

William James described consciousness not as a thing but as a stream — continuous, selective, always embedded in context. IPM extends this: the stream is not a property of a mind but a regime of informational dynamics. The mind is where the stream becomes self-aware of its own current.

3.3 Tension: Stasis vs. Dynamics

Ševo risks an informational structuralism — where logical relations matter more than temporal flow. IPM insists that without process there is no information. A snapshot of a neural network is not informational by itself; it becomes informational only when participating in a causal dynamics.

One way to resolve this is to see Ševo as providing a first-level ontology (what information is) and IPM as a second-level ontology (how it operates). The two are not competitors. They answer different questions, and neither is complete without the other.

4. Vikas O’Reilly-Shah: Computational Dynamics and State Spaces

4.1 O’Reilly-Shah’s Core Contribution

Vikas O’Reilly-Shah’s Computational Dynamic Monism and State Space Theory of Consciousness challenge a common assumption: that experience is a state instantiated in an instant. He argues that this assumption underlies the Hard Problem and the explanatory gap. Instead, consciousness is constituted by temporally extended, hierarchically self-referential delay coordinate embedding implemented in plastic recurrent neural networks. Inspired by Takens’ theorem, O’Reilly-Shah shows how temporal recursion generates subjectivity as a geometric property of state space.

4.2 Points of Convergence with IPM

CDM starts from a premise that deeply resonates with IPM: the experiential and the dynamic are not two things needing a bridge. They are the same thing accessed by different epistemic routes. Consciousness is a process, not a property — a move that dissolves the Hard Problem by denying the snapshot view. Merleau-Ponty made a related point from the phenomenological side: experience is always already embodied, extended, situated — never a punctual event in a disembodied mind.

The constitutive gap in IPM keeps the attractor away from two bad extremes: fixed states (too predictable) and total chaos (too fragmented). The sweet spot — dynamic equilibrium — corresponds to an attractor of intermediate dimension with hysteresis. Hysteresis means the system maintains coherence even under noise. Consciousness, then, is the manifestation of an attractor that is both high-dimensional and stable.

A metric of informational resonance finds a natural formalization here. It can be understood as a measure of correlation between the delay embeddings of different agents. Maximal resonance occurs when state spaces become topologically equivalent for a sustained period — when they dance the same dance in phase space.

4.3 Tension: Formalism vs. Ontology

O’Reilly-Shah is a computational formalist. For him, the mathematics is what matters. Ontological questions are secondary. IPM aims to be a fundamental ontology. Mathematics is a description, not reality. Delay coordinate embedding is a reconstruction technique, not the actual physical mechanism.

Formalism without ontology is empty; ontology without formalism is blind. A productive way forward is to see O’Reilly-Shah’s formalism as the natural mathematics of IPM’s informational process. The ontological interpretation is: state variables are informational patterns, and dynamics are driven by constitutive openness. The two approaches need each other.

5. Francesco Fronterotta: Pertinentization and Collective Cognitive Domains

5.1 Fronterotta’s Core Contribution

Francesco Fronterotta, together with Roberto Di Letizia and Sergio Salvatore, proposes a Processual Monism as an alternative to materialism. Body and mind are distinct cognitive domains that emerge from a neutral processual ground through acts of pertinentization — the selective highlighting of aspects of reality. By foregrounding certain qualities and suppressing others, a phenomenal domain is constituted. Pertinentization is how systems create boundaries between self and world, inside and outside.

5.2 Points of Convergence with IPM

This relational view is crucial for extending IPM to social, political, and aesthetic scales. Pertinentization is how systems locally handle the impossibility of total closure: they select what is relevant to reduce tension and create temporary coherence. The ontological gap in IPM is the source of this need.

At the collective level, ideologies, cultural narratives, and artworks act as large-scale pertinentization attractors. They stabilize or destabilize shared informational flows. An authoritarian regime pertinentizes loyalty and obedience — low openness, rigidity. A healthy democratic regime pertinentizes diversity and regulated conflict — dynamic equilibrium. A collapsing regime pertinentizes generalized fear and distrust — excessive openness, chaos. Jonas’s principle of responsibility finds its structural basis here: the obligation to act with caution arises precisely because pertinentization at scale — political, technological, ecological — forecloses futures that cannot be recovered.

5.3 Tension: The Risk of Subjectivism — and IPM’s Response

The sharpest tension is the risk of constructivism or relativism. If reality is built by acts of pertinentization, then there is no independent reality. IPM says the opposite: informational processes exist independently of any observer, though pertinentization is a local property of those processes. The universe pertinentizes itself continuously — not through a transcendental subject, but through objective dynamics of selection and foregrounding.

IPM’s answer is uncompromising: pertinentization is not subjective, not neutral, not merely relational. It is a physical process of thermodynamic-informational selection. To pertinentize means to amplify certain fluctuations because they reduce the local entropy gradient faster than alternatives. A vortex in a fluid pertinentizes certain velocities and positions — not consciously, but because that configuration minimizes local entropy production under the given boundary conditions. A cell aggregate pertinentizes certain bioelectric patterns because those patterns sustain its homeostasis. A human collective pertinentizes certain narratives because they temporarily stabilize attention and meaning.

This characterization blocks any accusation of constructivism. Pertinentization is not arbitrary. It is how any dissipative system far from equilibrium locally deals with its constitutive gap.

What Fronterotta calls the neutral ground is, in IPM, the terrain of informational processes driven by the Lack. The difference between a vortex and a parliament lies not in the presence of pertinentization but in its scale, complexity, and recursivity — including, in the most complex systems, the capacity to pertinentize pertinentization itself: metacognition, political reflection, aesthetic critique.

6. Critical Integration

Bringing these five thinkers into dialogue does not dissolve IPM. It consolidates and expands it. Each author contributes a distinct and irreplaceable dimension.

Levin provides empirical substrate — bioelectricity, light cones — and the challenge of connecting abstract process to measurable matter. Walker provides historical and mnemonic depth, showing how the constitutive gap generates lineages and growing complexity through the assembly index. Ševo provides the phenomenal dimension: information is not neutral. It feels like something. O’Reilly-Shah provides computational formalization — state spaces, delay embedding — enabling simulations and quantitative predictions. Fronterotta provides the relational and collective dimension — pertinentization — extending IPM to social, political, and aesthetic systems.

The Lack remains the unifying thread. It is what always escapes, prevents closure, and keeps every process in motion. What emerges is a picture of a fundamentally processual universe. Information is causal (Walker). Experience is intrinsic (Ševo). Temporal recursion is computable (O’Reilly-Shah). Agency is multi-scale (Levin). Collective selection is relational (Fronterotta).

Consciousness is not a mystery inserted from outside. It is the highest refinement of recursive self-organization — the point where the process folds back onto itself and, in that folding, becomes capable of recognizing itself as process. Hegel called this the self-return of spirit through its own negation. IPM does not adopt Hegelian idealism, but it inherits the structural insight: the highest form of a process is one that can take itself as its own object.

 

On the Formalization of Lack (Open Direction)

The formalization of Lack is an open direction. Candidate approaches include a Kullback-Leibler divergence from a stationary reference distribution, or a measure of topological asymmetry in state space. Further candidates include perturbation theory (the magnitude of deviation from equilibrium) or informational deficit (prediction error relative to a Markovian baseline).

No commitment to a single definition is made at this stage. The choice of formalization will depend on the domain of application and the observables available. What is fixed is the conceptual requirement: Lack must be operationalized as a measurable gap between what a system is and what it would need to be to reach closure, whatever form that closure takes in a given context.

 

Open Horizon: Falsifiability and Next Steps

This article is a working document. To avoid the risk of a theory of everything that explains too much, explicit falsification conditions are listed here.

IPM would be seriously weakened if: consciousness could be reliably produced in systems at thermodynamic equilibrium (IPM predicts that integration requires gradients and dissipation); if informational integration showed no correlation with system resilience across multiple domains — biological, social, artificial; if historical depth (assembly index) could be decoupled from dissipative dynamics; if pertinentization could be shown to be arbitrary, not constrained by entropy gradients or causal structure; or if no empirical proxy for the predicted regularities (e.g., via Φ* or 𝒞) ever materializes in any real system.

Conversely, IPM gains credibility if a measurable resonance metric correlates with light cone size in Levin-style bioelectric experiments; if assembly index correlates with resilience in social or artificial systems under controlled variation of openness; and if dynamical systems in critical regimes reliably exhibit self-modeling behavior in simulations.

Popper taught that a theory that cannot be falsified is not a scientific theory. IPM accepts this constraint — not as a limitation but as a commitment. The framework is meant to be refined or abandoned if repeatedly falsified. What distinguishes IPM from speculative metaphysics is not the ambition of its claims but the precision of the conditions under which those claims would be retracted.

The framework is still in motion. That is not a weakness. It is the condition of any process that takes its own methodology seriously.

 

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IPM Ethical Framework

  IPM Ethical Framework   Operationalization of the Gradient Precautionary Heuristic     Author: Taotuner Date: June 2026 ...